change must, it seems to me, address three issues. The first issue has to do with the concept that one has of the individual person and closely related notions of personality, character, identity, self, subject, mind or psyche. Second, the concept one has of the individual or person immediately implies a view on the relationship between the person and other persons. In other words, to understand any theory of personal change it is necessary to identify the view taken on the relation between the individual and the group or society. The third issue involved in any theory of personal change relates to the notion of causality upon which it is constructed. In other words, the question has to do with what causes personal change and how it does so. In this article, I will explore how different theories of personal change deal with these three issues. A theory focuses attention on some aspects of the phenomena of interest, thereby inevitably excluding other aspects. How one practices as a therapist is, therefore, very much affected by one's theory of personal change and as we become more expert we tend to take for granted the assumptions upon which our particular theory is built. I believe it is important, therefore, to revisit underlying assumptions about the individual, the group and causality because doing so clarifies how particular theories direct the attention of the therapy practitioner.
To start with, consider concepts of the individual person, that is, the experience of a self. The experience people have of a self differs from culture to culture and their understanding of this experience also evolves over time. In western culture, for example, the way in which people experienced themselves as persons changed dramatically from the Middle Ages to the Age of Enlightenment. In the following sections I will briefly outline the move from the mediaeval concept of self to three different ways we currently have of thinking about the nature of the self, namely, the autonomous individual, the expressivist individual and the social individual. Each of these concepts carries with it a different way of thinking about the social and a different conceptualization of the causality of personal change. Charles Taylor (1975) provides a very helpful summary of the basic features of the evolving western conception of the human subject and thus the experience of a self. He argues that in the Middle Ages there was no notion of the subject as a self in the modern sense. Instead, the subject was defined in relation to a cosmic order so that people thought of themselves as coming most fully to themselves when they were in touch with that cosmic order, or to put it another way, when they were in union with God. It was thought that a person knew about the world through interpreting the revelation provided by the Holy Scriptures and such acts of interpretation had to be in conformity with the teaching authority of the Church. Individual identity was also related to one's position or role within the social hierarchy. The individual subject was thus defined by external authority in relation to an external social and cosmic world and the group or society consisted simply of a given hierarchical order which individual subjects fitted into. From this mediaeval perspective, any notion of personal change would, therefore, have to be confined to processes of conforming more closely to external authority, finding greater unity with the social and cosmic order. A particular theory of causality is implicit in this view of the person and how the person changes and this is a view that everything in the universe moves according to natural laws which reveal God's glory so that the cause of personal change is God's grace.
The mediaeval sense of self

The modern, autonomous, rational individual
The aforementioned notion of the human subject changed dramatically over the roughly 300-year period of the scientific revolution, culminating in the modern notion of the self which was most clearly formulated by the Enlightenment philosophers in the 18th century. By the time of that Age of Reason, everything about the external world, including God, was open to doubt but one thing was not and that, according to Descartes, was the existence of the individual, doubting self. The human subject was then no longer defined in relation to external authority but, rather, was thought to define itself. Instead of immersion in, and acceptance of, the external world, self-consciousness was understood to require withdrawal from the objective world through individual, internal processes of observation and thought.
This modern self, now understood, following Leibniz, as a monad cut off from other monads, is aware of itself, defines itself, through processes of introspection and reason. The focus of attention thus shifts decisively from the external world, the outside of nature and society, to the internal world of mind inside an individual person. This conception of the individual mind as split off from the body, of individuals as split off from each other and the natural world goes hand in hand with an atomistic view of society and the objectification and control of nature. The natural and social worlds, as objects of control, confirm man's self-defining identity. It was the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1790 Kant ( /1987 , who most powerfully articulated this concept of the modern subject. For him humans were autonomous individuals in that each individual has the capacity, through innate powers of reason, to choose his or her own objectives and devise his or her own plans to realize them. In their interaction with each other, autonomous individuals are required to act ethically, otherwise society is impossible, and they discover what this means by acting on their own hypotheses as to what is good and then testing these hypotheses against the 'categorical imperative'.
Change in a person then becomes a rational reordering of individual thought processes carried out by the autonomous moral individual. Implicit in this view is a completely different notion of causality, namely, a rationalist causality. The cause of any personal change is no longer the divine but the rational effort of the autonomous moral individual. This theory in which personal change is caused by the rational powers can be contrasted with the causality of the scientific method. This is deterministic, efficient, 'if-then' causality, for example, if the force applied to an object in a vacuum is doubled, then it moves twice as far. It is clear that such a mechanistic theory of causality leaves no room for freedom or choice and therefore cannot apply to Kant's autonomous individual whose essence is the making of rational choices.
Kant was concerned with the problem of how a human being can be part of nature and so governed by nature's laws and yet be autonomous and able to make choices. He resolved this by positing that an individual was freed from deterministic laws when acting on the basis of reason and moral will, becoming subject instead to rationalist causality. However, when acting on the passions of the body, the individual was subject to the deterministic causality of nature and so not free. I will come back later to how this view of the modern self is reflected in modern clinical psychology and psychoanalysis.
Kant presented a further argument that would later come to have a major impact on how we have come to think about individuals and society. This was his development of the notion of 'system'.
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Systems thinking and the notion of the individual and the social
Kant argued that when it came to understanding inanimate matter then mechanistic 'if-then' causality yielded powerful hypotheses but another approach was required to understand organisms in nature. He suggested that it would be more useful to think of organisms as if they were systems -the 'as if' is important because he argued that we can never know reality in itself and so cannot say that organisms actually are systems. Kant defined a system as a bounded set of self-organizing, interacting parts which produce both themselves and an emergent whole. He argued that the self-organizing interaction of the parts constitutes a developmental process in which a more and more mature form of the system is unfolded. What is being unfolded, however, is already enfolded in the system right from the beginning. For example, an acorn already enfolds the mature form of the oak tree which is unfolded in its development from sapling to mature oak tree. This development occurs through the interaction of the parts (roots, trunk, branches, leaves), to produce both the whole system (oak tree) and the parts themselves, where the whole is more than the sum of the parts.
In developing the model of a system, Kant was putting forward a concept of causality, which we might call formative cause, in which the parts of a system interact to form that system which then affects them. What causes a system to become what it becomes is the formative process of its development. A system might, in turn, interact with other systems, as a part, to produce a suprasystem. Systems models, then, posit hierarchies, or levels, of a system. Since these system models are unfolding what is already unfolded, they have no internal capacity for producing novelty and thus cannot evolve. It is important to note that Kant argued against thinking of human action in terms of either mechanism or of system since both effectively deny the choice upon which individual autonomy depends. Clearly, if one's actions have a deterministic 'if-then' cause there is no choice available. This is true too if a human is thought of as a part of a system because a part only has meaning, as a part, if it fulfils the functioning of the system, not its own ends as an autonomous unit.
However, Kant's strictures have been widely ignored and the notions of efficient and formative causality found in the natural sciences have been imported into the human sciences, initially anyway, forgetting the 'as if' nature of the system construct. This importation became very evident during the 1930s and 1940s, as a number of scholars worked in related areas, very much in conversation with each other, culminating in some important publications around 1950 (for example, Ashby, 1952 Ashby, , 1956 Forrester, 1958; von Bertalanffy, 1968; Wiener, 1948) . The related areas covered systems of control, the development of computer language, the development of a new science of mind in reaction to behaviourism, namely, cognitivism (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943) , and the formulation of the sender-receiver model of human communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) . This systems movement has come to form the foundation of today's dominant discourse in sociology, psychology and organizational theory, thus importing what is essentially the engineer's notion of control into understanding human activity. From the systemic, cognitivist perspective, the individual mind came to be understood as a rational, autonomous system inside a person which processed information to form mental models and maps thus constituting an internal world, while collectivities of such individuals came to be understood as social systems.
The modernist individual and the systemic society in today's cognitive-behavioural and psychoanalytic therapies
Kant's notion of the rational, autonomous individual and the later application of his notion of system to human beings together provide the foundational assumptions of CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 11 (2) clinical psychology with its cognitive-behavioural approach to therapy. The focus of attention in this therapy is on the individual's thought processes and the therapist's role is to assist the individual to become aware of dysfunctional thought patterns and to work at changing them. The work of change consists of exercises which reinforce desired changes in thought patterns and reinforcement is provided by different kinds of conditioning rewards or punishments. From this perspective, when the individual changes his or her mental models and maps then behaviour will change, with more realistic mental models resulting in more functional behaviour. Clinical psychologists have always been described as scientist practitioners and, more recently, as reflective scientist practitioners in which therapy is a rational activity of mental and behavioural change, the laws and techniques of such change being amenable to scientific testing in the same vein as evidence-based medicine. The theory of causality underlying this approach is a combination of rationalist cause where it is reasoning that leads to changes in mental models and mechanistic 'if-then' causality implied in behavioural conditioning and evidence-based testing. The emotional life of the individual receives far less explicit attention and indeed it is highly emotional thinking which is thought to be the cause of dysfunctional behaviour. This reflects Kant's separation of mind and body in which humans are free when they act on reason and not free when they act on the passions of the body. The cognitivist perspective on mind is completely consistent with the systemic view of group and society found in mainstream sociology but society as such features very little in the theory and practice of the therapeutic process. This theory of personal change, then, focuses the therapist's attention on the individual and on rational processes of thinking.
Freud built his psychoanalytic theory partly on assumptions of 'if-then' causality imported from physics and partly on formative causality in the emphasis he placed on developmental processes. His models of the psyche present, in effect, a psychic system which unfolds already unfolded drives and universal behavioural patterns such as the Oedipus complex. However, he radically challenged the notion of the rational individual who is free to choose goals and actions by arguing that our actions are mostly driven by irrational, unconscious motivations. He established the central importance of anxiety and human responses to it, taking the form of fantasy, emotion, and defensive, repressing mechanisms which he located in the individual as 'the unconscious'. In doing this, he put forward another concept of causality, taking the form of a causal agent located beneath or behind rational choice where this agent acts on the basis of drives arising in the body. Perhaps we could call this unconscious causality.
From this perspective, dysfunctional behaviour arises from unconscious repression and unconsciously repeated defensive patterns. In effect the individual is then acting in a way dictated by the bodily emotions and unconscious fantasies which trap the him or her in repetitive patterns in which there is no freedom of choice. This is essentially Kant's argument when he says that when our behaviour is determined by bodily emotions rather than reason then we are not free. The aim of psychoanalytic therapy is to bring about awareness on the part of the individual of the unconscious, repetitive, fantasy-driven nature of his or her thinking and behaviour. This enables the individual to change through introspection and reason, thus becoming more autonomous and less dependent. In this way, thinking and behaviour can become more reality congruent. The cause of the change is thus rational analysis and choice, opening up the possibility for the individual to move from dependency to autonomy, which is the Kantian notion of the rational autonomous individual. What Freud shows is that rational autonomy is not guaranteed and is an achievement rather than being innate. Psychoanalysts after Freud have, of course, greatly elaborated his theory and changed it in important respects but the STACEY: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN THERAPEUTIC WORK fundamental assumptions about causality and the central focus of attention on the individual have not changed.
Psychoanalytic theory presents a particular view of the relationship between the individual and the group or society. Individuals are thought of as forming groups and societies, which are entities outside of themselves, through intrapsychic processes of identification, introjection, projection and projective identification which involve the transmission of mental contents from one individual to another, which is, of course, the sender-receiver model of communication. This external entity then acts back on the individual as causal agent of his or her behaviour. In early development, the social is brought to the individual by the father in the form of constraints on behaviour. The individual's psyche is unfolded in the oedipal stage, involving a clash between the father representing society and the individual's own drives. The social thus enters into the formation of an individual's psyche in the first few years of life and the social phenomenon of overwhelming concern in this theorizing is the family. This has continued to be the case in later developments of self psychology and attachment theory in psychoanalysis. It is in the early experience of family life that an individual develops the defensive mechanisms and fantasies which will prove problematic in later life.
Furthermore, in later life the individual is thought to regress on entering into a group, and to avoid this it is necessary for there to be some form of hierarchical organization with clarity of roles and tasks and some means of containing the anxiety thought to be inherent in group life. This is a view of the social as being fundamentally at odds with the individual who is always in danger of losing individuality on entering a group, particularly a large group or crowd. In early psychoanalytic theory, group psychology was thought to reflect the same patterns as individual psychology -the group was the individual writ large and both reflected a universal oedipal experience. Later, relational and intersubjective psychoanalysts (Mitchell & Aron, 1999; Ogden, 1994; Stolorow, Atwood, & Brandschaft, 1994) explicitly took up systems thinking to understand the psychoanalytic dyad, group and the society as systems formed by individuals. This immediately brings in the notion of formative causality. Human action is then understood in terms of three causal concepts, namely, rationalist, unconscious and formative. Human action is thought to be controlled, on the one hand, by 'supra-agencies' such as society and the 'group as a whole' and, on the other hand, by 'sub-agencies' such as the individual 'unconscious' or the 'collective unconscious'.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the focus of the therapist's attention is on the impact of early family life on the unconsciously repeated, defensive patterns in an individual's behaviour. Through the technique of interpretation the individual may be brought to awareness of these and how they are causing problems. When dealing with groups, the therapist is concerned with interpreting regressive, unconscious processes thus freeing individuals from such distorting group processes. Change is a move to the real, the autonomous, and the organized.
There are, of course other perspectives on personal change and these too were reflected in the philosophical discussions during and just after Kant's time. One such alternative perspective is what Taylor (1975) calls the 'expressivist individual'.
The expressivist individual and humanistic psychology
Going back to the time of Kant, some philosophers objected to his articulation of the rational, autonomous, moral individual because of the split it implied between mind and body and the split between man and nature. Particularly influential here was the work of the German philosopher, Herder, who took an expressivist approach. From this CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 11(2) perspective, each individual has his or her own intrinsic way of being and to become anything other than this is a distortion or mutilation. The subject is then characterized by an inner force imposing itself on the world in a process of actualizing itself. It is this self-actualizing process that forms the subject so that the subject is constituted in its expression of feelings and aspirations to others and to itself. It is this expressive process that makes determinate what the subject feels and wants. The fullest expression of the subject is where he or she realizes and clarifies what he or she wants, thus actualizing an essence or form which is not fully determinate before being fulfilled. Although the subject is still self-defining it is no longer split off from nature and mind is no longer split off from body because the subject is fundamentally embodied. The moral act is then the authentic expression in which the subject realizes what he or she potentially is. The expressivist perspective enhances the notion of freedom, that is, authentic selfexpression, as a value. However, such freedom is not simply related to an individual body because it implies a higher aspiration to the freedom and expression of the whole of nature including other human beings. The ultimate self-actualization lies in communion with nature and others.
The origins of modern humanistic psychology are clearly evident in this thinking. It emphasizes the importance of bodily feelings, motivation, aspiration, inspiration and communion as essential to the process of individual self-actualization, just as modern humanistic psychology does. Society is the collective of such self-actualizing individuals. This provides us with another theory of change in which an inner urge to self-actualize through communion with nature and other humans provides the cause of change in formative processes of self-definition. The causality here is formative. Personal change is then this formative process of self-actualization and the cause is the innate urge to selfexpress. Humanistic psychology thus focuses our attention on the expressivist individual, rather than the autonomous one, and it too displays the effects of systems thinking. The individual actualizes himself or herself in communion with others understood as a social system and, in some versions, with nature and the cosmos, also understood as suprasystems. From this perspective, the therapist focuses attention on the selfactualizing individual and change comes about through the individual being provided with opportunities for cathartic emotional expression, often involving some kind of immersion in the community of humans and nature.
I now want to turn to an alternative view, one in which the individual is understood to be radically social.
Social individuals
Although seeing expression as an individual phenomenon, Herder was beginning to point to a more social way of understanding the subject in his emphasis on language and art as the media through which self-expression is realized. For him, language was not just a set of signs which have meaning because they refer to something else. Words do not just describe but express a mode of consciousness, realizing and making determinate that mode. Herder, then, reacted to a view of society made up of atomistic, morally selfsufficient subjects entering into external relations with each other, suggesting instead a view of society in which modes of consciousness emerge in the social activities of language and art.
The German philosopher, Hegel (1807) , was influenced by the thought of Herder, particularly the notion of modes of consciousness being constituted in social activities. For Hegel, the individual was a cultural being, necessarily dependent on others, who only develops a mind and purposes of his or her own in interaction with others. Individuals STACEY: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN THERAPEUTIC WORK can only find freedom in a society with institutions and cultures that nurture freedom. Hegel argued that society, culture and thus modes of thought and consciousness, all evolved in conflictual interactions between people. It was in this process that modes of consciousness displayed continuity and were at the same time transformed. Hegel greatly emphasized the social processes of recognition, arguing that a sense of self arose in social processes of mutual recognition -I can only recognize myself as a self in the recognition of those I recognize. In this way of thinking, therefore, we move away from the modern notion of self as either the autonomous or the expressivist individual to a notion of interdependent people whose individual selves are constituted in their interaction with each other. From this perspective, individual change cannot be separated from change in the groups to which an individual belongs. This way of thinking also indicates a different theory of causality -an essentially paradoxical or dialectical theory -in which change or evolution in individual and social interaction are caused by that very interaction itself. Interacting individuals are forming the patterns of their interaction, the social, while at the same time they are being formed as individuals by these patterns of interaction.
What is noticeable, I think, is how little effect this particular way of thinking has had on the major theories of the person and personal change. The only exception I can think of is some aspects of Foulkes's (1948 Foulkes's ( , 1964 Foulkes's ( , 1990 ) group-analytic model in which he was influenced to some extent by the sociologist Norbert Elias, whose work, in turn, was influenced by Hegel. Elias argued that the individual was the singular of interdependent people while the social was the plural of interdependent people. Foulkes argued in a similar vein when he said that the individual was social through and through. I think we can get a clearer view of what this might mean in the work of another philosopher sociologist who was influenced by Hegel, namely, George Herbert Mead. Mead (1934) placed communicative interaction between bodies at the centre of his understanding of what consciousness and self-consciousness mean. He argued that human consciousness and self-consciousness arise in social processes which he referred to as the conversation of gestures. According to Mead, human communication takes place in the medium of significant symbols, that is, gestures in which one body calls forth (evokes) in itself similar responses to those being called forth (evoked) in others. In this way, one body can anticipate, can know, what the response to its gesture might be. In other words, communicative interaction constitutes consciousness, the ability to know what we are doing. Mind is then understood as the action of a body directed to itself in a kind of private role play, while that body is gesturing and responding to other bodies. The vocal gesture, language, is of particular importance in this role play because one can hear oneself speak in much the same way as others can, making it easier to evoke in oneself similar responses to those evoked in others. Mind is then understood as silent conversation with oneself. Here we move away from the notion of mind as an internal world of representations to a bodily action theory of mind. When we talk about the social, we are talking about the public vocal action of bodies directed to each other, evoking responses from each other. When we talk about mind we are talking about the private, silent action of an individual body directed to itself. Mind and society are thus constituted in the same processes of communicative interaction between bodies. Without society there can be no individual mind and without individual, interdependent minds there can be no society. Selfconsciousness is also a social process in that it is constituted by the individual taking the attitude of the society to himself or herself. It is these social processes of consciousness and self-consciousness that enable us to co-operate and compete with each other in CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 11(2) sophisticated ways and at the same time constrain us from doing whatever we want -we must take the attitude of the other if we are to communicate.
Consciousness, self-consciousness and communicative interaction
Central to Mead's theory is the process of generalization in which each body evokes in itself similar responses not only to the specific others present in current interaction but, at the same time, to the group or society. In all our interactions with each other we are always taking the attitude of our society in general, making us, as individuals, social through and through. These generalized tendencies to act are iterated in each present as rather repetitive, habitual and thus largely unconscious patterns of action. However, in their continual iteration, these general tendencies to act are normally particularized in the specific situation and the specific present the actors find themselves in, with its specific understanding of the past and its specific expectations for the future. Such particularization is inevitably a conflictual process of interpretation as the meaning of the generalization is established in a specific situation. The possibility of transformation, that is, further evolution of these generalizations, arises in this conflictual particularizing of the generalization because of the potential for human spontaneity to generate variety in human action and the capacity of nonlinear interaction to amplify consequent small differences. These generalizations evolve in the history of a society and each individual is born into such a world of generalizations, learning to take them up in his or her conduct in ways that are largely unconscious. However, such generalizations are not simply forming action because they are at the same time formed by human action. In other words, individuals are forming social interactions while being formed by them in evolutionary processes. Mead (1923) also saw the importance of human tendencies to idealize. People have a tendency to individualize and idealize a collective and treat it 'as if' it had overriding motives or values, amounting to a process in which the collective constitutes a 'cult'. Members of 'cults' forget the 'as if' nature of their construct and act in a manner driven by the cult's values. Cults are maintained when leaders present to people's imagination a future free from obstacles that could prevent them from being what they all want to be. A cult provides a feeling of enlarged personality in which individuals participate and from which they derive their value as persons. It is important to stress that cult values can be good or bad or both. Cult values would include 'ethnic purity' and 'loving your neighbor'. Mead points out that the process of idealization is far from unproblematic and could easily lead to actions that others outside the cult will come to regard as bad, even evil. Mead was pointing to the dangers of focusing on the cult values themselves and directly applying them as overriding universal norms, conformity to which constitutes the requirement of continuing membership of the institution. Normally, however, idealization is accompanied by functionalization. Cult values can become functional values in the everyday interactions between members of a group rather than being simply applied in a way that enforces conformity. For example, the cult value of a hospital might be to 'provide each patient with the best possible care' but this has to be repeatedly functionalized in many unique specific situations throughout the day. As soon as cult values become functional values in real daily interaction, conflict arises and it is this conflict that must be negotiated by people in their practical interaction with each other.
So, Mead explains how consciousness and self-consciousness arise in the capacity of each human to take the attitude of both specific others and the generalized/idealized other at the same time. Individual mind is social through and through because it is patterns of interaction of the body with itself that always involve the generalized/idealized tendencies to act to be found in the experience of the group or society. However, this is not social determinism because of the human capacity for spontaneous responses. This theory of mind differs from the other theories described earlier in that it does not STACEY: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN THERAPEUTIC WORK separate individual self and society but regards them as the same process. The self is understood to be under perpetual construction in communicative interaction with others rather than as an essence to be actualized, as in humanistic psychology, or patterns of behaviour largely already formed in childhood through the clash between individual nature and society represented by the family, as in psychoanalysis, or as an innately given information processor, as in cognitivist psychology. When one thinks in terms of the social individual, one pays attention to social processes in the present as much as in the past and these social processes are understood in terms far wider than just the family. From this perspective, ordinary everyday conversation, with its always intertwined nonverbal 'body language' and feelings, is the way in which humans co-operate and conflict with each other in order to accomplish their tasks, their living together, and the formation of their very identities or selves. This is a very different view of the relationship between the individual and the social to the psychoanalytic one where the individual psyche is formed in childhood by a clash between innate drives and social constraint and the individual always runs the risk of losing individuality in a group. From the perspective of the social individual, the self, individuality, is continually co-constructed in social relations. What is being emphasized here is the interdependence, rather than the autonomy or individual expressivity, of individuals. Personal change means changes in conversation, that is, social change, and vice versa.
Power and identity
The immediate consequence of interdependence is that the behaviour of every individual is both enabled and constrained by the expectations and demands of both others and themselves. To carry on participating in communicative interaction, individuals have to rely on the enabling co-operation of others. At the same time, they have to respect the wishes of others and those wishes will frequently conflict with their own. Communicative interaction is thus a process in which people account for their actions and negotiate their next actions and this is a political process. Because all relationships have these characteristics, all relationships are power relations (Elias, 1978 (Elias, , 1991 . Since an individual mind is the private role play of communicative interaction, taking the same form as the public, it follows that an individual mind is also a role play in power, a private political process. This is a self-referential, reflexive process in which individual minds are formed by power relations while they are, at the same time, forming those power relations.
This process of power relating immediately establishes power differences between groups of people in which some are 'included' and others are 'excluded' (Elias & Scotson, 1994) . Well-established groups develop cohesion and come to think of themselves as a 'we', a group with common attachments, likes, dislikes and attributes that have emerged simply because of their being together over a period of time. In this way individuals may develop a strong 'we' identity that is inseparable from their 'I' identities. Other groups may lack such a cohesive identity and this makes them vulnerable. Members of such groups develop a very weak sense of 'we' identity and, as a consequence, weak 'I' identities too. More cohesive groups find it easy to 'name' the less cohesive and ascribe to them hateful attributes such as being dirty or liable to commit crimes (Dalal, 2002) . Although there may be no obvious difference between two groups, one may unconsciously use labels to generate hate thus maintaining a power difference in relation to the other. Furthermore, this may, in a sense, be 'accepted' by the less cohesive group who then takes up the role of the disadvantaged.
We could say that an ideology emerges in the communicative interaction within and between groups which reinforces membership categories and differences between CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 11(2) them. A key aspect of ideology is the binary oppositions that characterize it and the most basic of these is the distinction between 'them' and 'us'. Ideology is thus a form of communication that preserves the current order by making that current order seem natural (Dalal, 1998) . In this way, ideological themes organize the communicative interactions of individuals and groups. As a form of communication, as an aspect of the power relations in the group, ideology is taken up in that private role play, that silent conversation, which is mind in individuals.
Any change in the process of communicative interaction must at the same time constitute a shift in power relations and, therefore, a change in the pattern of who is 'included' and who is 'excluded'. Such shifts generate intense anxiety and communicative interaction is recruited in some way to deal with this existential anxiety. These ways may be highly destructive of effective joint action and may even completely disrupt the reproduction and creative transformation of coherent communication.
The inclusion-exclusion dynamics discussed earlier are also reflected in family structures. In a study of a particular locality in England, Elias and Scotson (1994) described how family structures differed between a well-established and a newcomer group. In the former, as a result of a long history of living together, there were extended, mothercentred families comprising two-or-three-generation kinship networks. In the latter, however, families consisted mainly of parents and two children. The wider kinship networks of the former enabled more visiting and gossip and so greater possibilities of sustaining the ideology which denigrated the group with limited kinship networks. The ideology served the unconscious purpose of maintaining the favourable power balance of the established group whose close-knit families occupied more important communal positions. Family structure and the wider social inclusion-exclusion dynamics form and are formed by each other at the same time. This renders problematic family-centred ways of thinking about the family as a universal human phenomenon instead of understanding how family and social processes form and are formed by each other.
Growing up in different communities, with their different kinds of family structure, has a powerful effect on identity because of the very different sense of 'we' identities. Since individual and group are but two aspects of the same process, it follows that individual, or 'I' identities will also be very different. People experience themselves as they do as much because of the social process of inclusion and exclusion as any intrafamily processes. To understand individuals from families in a particular group one has to understand the wider social processes of interaction between that group and others. For the therapist this is as important as family relating. The therapist then thinks of unconscious processes in terms of the impact of social dynamics on family processes and the personal identities of family members, where what is unconscious is the inclusion-exclusion process and its consequences. And one of the principal consequences is power differentials. Power confers on a group much more than economic advantage because the struggle is about the satisfaction of needs to do with esteem and identity. Weaker, less cohesive groups suffer deprivation of identity and of meaning. These dynamics of power relations and inclusion-exclusion, with their concomitant charisma and disgrace, can also be detected within families. This may be evidenced in subgroups within the family where a parent, child or other relative, or grouping of them, come to be experienced as charismatic and others as disgraced and this may well mirror what is going on in the wider social processes.
The implications for therapeutic practice
In briefly commenting on the implications for therapeutic practice of the social individual (Stacey, 2003) , I want to focus on group therapy. I am not doing this because group STACEY: THEORIES OF CHANGE IN THERAPEUTIC WORK work is more social than individual work. Indeed, from the perspective I am taking, solitary individual introspection and one-on-one contact with another are both just as social as encountering more people in a group. I want to focus on group therapy because I think there is a strong resonance between Foulkes's (1948 Foulkes's ( , 1964 Foulkes's ( , 1990 group-analytic practice and the perspective I have been outlining under the heading of the social individual.
Central to Foulkesian practice is the emphasis placed on what he called free-floating communication, by which he meant spontaneous conversation without any agenda. Foulkes said that a group becomes more therapeutic for its members the more communication between them is widened and deepened. Why this should be so is well explained, I think, by the perspective of the social individual. I have frequently asked members of therapy groups what they say to themselves when they are in the grip of some neurotic condition. It is striking, although on reflection not all that surprising, how they always report highly repetitive, very meager conversations with themselves. To be caught in this sparse and repetitive conversation with oneself is, from my own experience, very distressing and almost impossible to escape on one's own. Almost always, and from the perspective I am taking inevitably so, the pattern of conversation with others is just as meager and repetitive. Those whose relationships with themselves and others are being experienced as highly unsatisfactory almost always bring to group sessions the same story over and over again with very little variety indeed. Their relationships with themselves and others lack spontaneity and they show little capacity for improvisation.
What the therapy group then provides is an opportunity, session after session, to participate in a different kind of conversation. The therapy group is therapeutic when the communication between members becomes richer, wider and deeper, as people ask different and more searching questions of each other and start to bring stories of their relationships with others that display greater variety. People in such a group experience the improvisational nature of free-floating communication and develop a greater capacity for spontaneity, perhaps for the first time in their lives. Since people are social selves and mental process are the same as social ones, members of the therapy group are learning to conduct silent conversations with themselves which are richer and more variegated. Now there is both continuity and transformation at the same time in conversational patterns and this brings with it feelings of wellbeing.
I am suggesting, then, that taking a social perspective on therapeutic practice is not really about the therapist becoming more aware of, and working more intensely with, wider social issues, although that may come into it. Taking a social perspective is essentially seeing that, as social processes, group therapy can be transformative when attention is paid to the patterns of communication, understanding that mental health is the same as complex conversations while simplification, the loss of complexity, constitutes illness.
This has particular implications for how the therapist understands his or her role. The therapist is as much a participant in the group conversation as anyone else. The impact of the therapist depends upon the quality of his or her participation and how the way of taking part in the conversation promotes greater conversational complexity, providing an important role model. I think it points to the need for a much more active and ordinary participation than more traditional approaches call for. There are of course, differences between the role of therapist and other group members, mainly to do with power. The configuration of power is such that the power ratio is titled to the therapist. How the therapist takes up and works with the power difference then becomes a matter of great importance. Which techniques tilt the power ratio even further to the therapist, and which do the opposite, becomes the question. Foulkes pointed to the importance of CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 11(2) the therapist weaning the group away from dependence on him or her. It is important to keep in mind the matter of power difference because it blocks tendencies to idealize the group. Groups may be immensely destructive as well as therapeutic (Nitsun, 1996) . Therapists who are unwittingly authoritarian, manipulative, intrusive or charismatic can cause enormous harm.
I think the group exerts a therapeutic effect in another important way and this has to do with belonging, another matter stressed by Foulkes. I talked earlier about the importance to each of us of our 'we' identity derived from the groups we belong to. It seems to me that most people who come to a therapy group experience rather weak or disadvantaged 'we' identities. As feelings of belonging in the group grow, so does the strength of a new 'we' identity and this may well be experienced as therapeutic.
